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Extensive reforms of India‟s indirect taxes at the central and the state 
levels has prepared the necessary ground for the implementation of a 
comprehensive  goods  and  services  tax  (GST).  The  Empowered 
Committee of the State Finance Ministers in their First Discussion Paper 
and the Thirteenth Finance Commission in their recently submitted report 
have suggested GST models which are quite different in many respects. 
This paper identifies these differences and argues that within the regime 
of  taxation  of  goods  and  services  in  India  environmental  tax  reform 
should also be incorporated to make the tax regime play a significant role 
in managing environment. The environment tax reforms will yield both a 
fiscal  double  dividend  and  an  economic  double  dividend  making  the 
Indian economy pursue a path of sustainable development.  
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The  indirect  tax  system  in  India  has  undergone  extensive  reforms  for 
more  than  two  decades.  Even  after  these  reforms,  it  is  still  a  highly 
fragmented and distortionary tax structure characterized by multiple tax 
rates,  barriers  to  inter-state  trade,  and  cascading  of  taxes.  However, 
these  reforms  have  succeeded  in  preparing  the  ground  for  the 
introduction of a comprehensive goods and services tax (GST). The GST 
has significant implications for the environmental management. In this 
paper, we argue that the environmental taxes should be integrated into 
the  current  design  of  GST.  This  will  be  consistent  with  the  recent 
international experience where eco-taxes are increasingly being used to 
achieve environmental objectives while imparting a „green shift‟ to the tax 
system. 
 
The paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 looks the role 
of  eco-taxes  for  environmental  management.  Section  3  examines  the 
progress  of  indirect  tax  reforms  in  India  culminating  into  the  GST 
proposals. Section 4 discusses the three basic designs of GST currently 
being discussed and highlights the place of environmental taxes in these 
designs. Section  5 analyses the international experience in this regard 
and the key lessons for India. Section 6 outlines a suitable design for 
integrating environmental taxes into the GST design. Section 7 provides 
concluding observations.  
 
2. ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES 
 
An  environmental  tax  is  Pigouvian  tax  on  polluters.  It  can  induce 
appropriate  environmental  decisions  by  raising  the  relative  costs  of 
polluting  inputs  and  outputs  and  thereby  correcting  the  negative 
externalities of a polluting activity.  Many economists have argued that 
pollution levies are an efficient instrument for achieving environmental 
objectives (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1988). In a full-employment model  
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with  mobile  firms,  Wellisch  (1995)  shows  that  direct  controls  lead  to 
inefficiently low levels of emissions, while taxes continue to produce an 
efficient outcome.  
 
Levied on output, it is aimed at raising the price of the output, 
inducing  consumers  to  reduce  consumption  levels  or  shift  to  non-
polluting  substitutes.  Its  impact  depends  on  the  price-elasticity  of  the 
polluting  good  and  availability  and  relative  prices  of  close  substitutes. 
Levied  on  inputs,  any  increase  in  the  prices  may  be  partially  or  fully 
passed  on  to  the  final  goods,  depending  on  the  supply  and  demand 
elasticities. To the extent that the producers have to bear the burden of 
the  price  rise,  they  will  explore  the  option  of  using  non-polluting 
substitutes. Technological innovations reducing the use of the polluting 
inputs and increasing the use of non-polluting substitutes may also be 
induced. The environmental tax may be levied directly on the pollutant 
like a carbon tax or indirectly on polluting inputs. Administering the tax 
directly on the pollutant is often  costly and difficult  to implement and 
may sometimes be not consistent with constitutional design of taxes. 
 
Should these be Revenue-neutral or Revenue-augmenting?  
The “Double-Dividend” Possibility 
If  the  environmental  taxes  are  designed  to  be  revenue-neutral,  there 
would be a corresponding reduction in other conventional taxes. Since 
the conventional taxes are distortionary, deadweight costs of taxes can 
be  reduced.  The  basic  idea  of  the  double  dividend  hypothesis  is  that 
using  environmental  tax  revenue  to  reduce  the  existing  distortionary 
taxes might be welfare improving regardless of the environmental gain 
(see  e.g.,  Oates,  1991;  Pearce,  1991;  Bovenberg  and  de  Mooij,1994). 
Ballard and Medema (1992) argue that conventional taxes that tax labour 
and capital income are „perverse‟ taxes as they penalise the „goods‟ , viz., 
human labour and the successful use of capital rather  than taxing the 
„bads‟,  viz.  the  overuse  of  energy  and  primary  resources  that  lead  to 
pollution  and  consumption  of  exhaustible  resources.  Weizsacker  et  al  
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(2005)  argue  that  ecological  tax  reforms  should  be  taken  up  as  a 
„revenue-neutral, slowly progressing long-term tax shift‟.    
    
  To the extent that promotion of „environment‟ is a public good, 
like all public goods, financing of this public good should also be from the 
general pool of taxes including the environmental taxes. The supply of all 
public  goods  including  the  environmental  public  good  should  be 
determined by reference to the principle of „marginal social cost of public 
funds‟. The marginal social cost of public funds is the ratio between the 
shadow price of tax revenues and the population average of the social 
marginal utility of income. In defining the utility function, environmental 
public good should be included in addition to other public goods. In the 
literature,  it  is  generally  argued  that  for  an  optimal  tax  system  the 
marginal  social  cost  of  public  funds  should  be  equal  to  one.  In  the 
literature, there are two traditions in this context (see, e.g. Ballard and 
Fullerton, 1992). In the Harberger-Pigou-Browning tradition the marginal 
cost of public funds is always larger than unity and the Dasgupta-Stiglitz-
Atkinson-Stern tradition where it may be larger or lower than one. In the 
first  tradition  the  marginal  project  is  a  lump  sum  transfer  to  a 
representative consumer financed by a distortionary tax. A marginal cost 
of public funds greater than unity then occurs because the dead-weight 
loss  of  taxation.  Lundholm  (2005)  shows  that  under  optimal  taxes,  a 
positive net social benefit is a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
project  that  passes  the  cost–benefit  test.  Under  non–optimal  taxes,  if 
taxes are too low, a positive net social benefit is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. In these analyses, environmental public good in the 
social welfare is not included nor are environmental taxes included in the 
cost function of taxes. If the analysis is extended to include these, the 
following  are  the  likely  effects:  given  other  things  inclusion  of 
environmental public good should increase the size of the public sector 
relative to GDP and lower the deadweight costs of financing these since 
environmental  taxes  curb  both  negative  externalities  of  pollution  and 
reduce the deadweight cost of non-environmental taxes. There will be  
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reduction in demand for non-environmental public goods (e.g. less need 
for public provision of health care, maintenance of roads), and private 
goods (less private health care costs). Extension of the existing literature 
in  these  directions  would  provide  further  insights  about  the  impact  of 
providing  environmental  public  goods  accompanied  by  environmental 
taxes. 
   
Are they Effective in Reducing Pollution? 
Positive Evidence  
Both  practical  experience  and  simulation  models  indicate  that 
environmental  tax  can  be  effective  in  reducing  taxation.  For  example, 
Symons, Proops and Gay (1994) use a demand system with estimated 
demand elasticities to study reduction in emissions resulting entirely from 
consumer demand responses. They modeled the carbon tax as a set of 
ad  valorem  taxes  on  commodity  groups.  Using  input-output  data  for 
calculating  the  consumers‟  responses  to  the  price  changes,  they  have 
taken 14 sector house hold survey commodity grouping and 28 sector 
input-output  classification  for  Australia  for  the  price  changes  and  the 
corresponding  demand  changes.  They  also  investigated  the  effect  of 
allowing for substitution in production.  They observe that the order of 
magnitude of a carbon tax to reduce emissions in Australia by 20 percent 
(assuming no technological substitution) is high (at A$414 or US$306 per 
tonne of carbon) but it is less than that calculated by Symons, Proops 
and Gay (1994) for the UK (US$411).  
    
How Should the Rate of Environmental Taxes be Determined?  
Some Insights  
Implementing a Pigouvian tax requires complete information of marginal 
abatement  cost  and  marginal  damage  functions.  Given  the  related 
information  difficulties,  Baumol  and  Oates  (1988)  have  suggested  that 
standards  should  be  set  to  serve  as  targets  and  fiscal  measures  and 
other instruments should be designed to achieve these. 
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While generally, partial equilibrium frameworks are used for this purpose, 
analyses in general equilibrium framework offer additional insights. In a 
general-equilibrium setting, Sandmo (1975) and Bovenberg and Frederick 
van der Ploeg (1994) have demonstrated how the well-known “Ramsey” 
formula  for  optimal  commodity  taxes  is  altered  when  one  of  the 
consumption  commodities  generates  an  externality.  Bovenberg  and 
Goulder  (1996)  examine  the  optimal  environmental  taxation  in  the 
presence  of  other  taxes  in  a  general-equilibrium  framework.  They 
examine how optimal environmental tax rates deviate from rates implied 
by  the  Pigouvian  principle  in  a  second-best  setting  where  other 
distortionary taxes are present. They link the optimal rate for a newly 
imposed environmental tax to the marginal excess burden from existing 
taxes. Their study indicates that in the presence of distortionary taxes, 
optimal environmental tax rates are generally below the rates suggested 
by the Pigouvian principle even when revenues from environmental taxes 
are used to cut distortionary taxes. The numerical  simulations  support 
this analytical result. Under central values for parameters, optimal carbon 
tax  rates  from  the  numerical  model  (when  the  tax  system  is  fully 
optimized)  are  between  6  and  12  percent  below  the  marginal 
environmental damages. In addition, the numerical model shows that in 
the presence of realistic policy constraints, optimal carbon tax rates are 
far  below  the  marginal  environmental  damages  and  may  even  be 
negative. Simulations based on the U.S. tax system indicate that if policy 
makers can only incrementally alter existing distortionary taxes (rather 
than globally optimize the tax system); the optimal carbon tax may be 
substantially below the marginal environmental damages.
 1   
 
                                                 
1 These considerations suggest that estimates of optimal carbon taxes in integrated climate 
economy  models  (for  example,  Nordhaus,  1993,  and  Peck  and  Teisberg,  1992)  are 
biased upward. While the Nordhaus study accounts for the efficiency gains connected 
with the reduction (through recycling) of initial distortionary taxes, it does not consider 
the efficiency  costs stemming  from the interactions between  remaining distortionary 
taxes and the newly imposed carbon tax.  
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  Nordhaus  (1993)  examines  the  optimal  greenhouse  gas 
reductions and the tax policy in the dynamic integrated climate-economy 
(DICE)  model.
2  He  considered   how  recycling  carbon -tax  revenues 
through cuts in distortionary taxes affect the optimal carbon tax. When 
revenues from the carbon tax are returned in lump -sum fashion, the 
optimal tax rate for the first decade is about $5 per tonne; the optimal 
rate rises to $59 per tonne when revenues are devoted to reducing 
distortionary  taxes.  This  model  integrates  the  economic  costs  and 
benefits  of  other  green  house  gases  (GHG)  reduction  wit h  a  simple 
dynamic  representation  of  the  scientific  links  of  emissions, 
concentrations,  and  climate  change.  The  model  contains  two  policy 
variables,  conventional  investment  and  reduction  of  the  rate  of 
emissions. The latter represents the fractional reduct ion of emissions 
relative to the uncontrolled level. The model determines the optimal 
control rate along with its dual variable, the derivative of the objective 
function with respect to emissions, which is the “carbon tax”. Two key 
parts  of  the  model  are  the  climate-  damage  function  and  the  GHG-
reduction cost function.  The results suggest that the optimal policy has a 
global benefit relative to no controls of $16 billion annually. This policy 
would have a GHG control rate of slightly less than 10 percent in the first 
period.  The  optimal  carbon  tax  would  rise  steadily  over  the  coming 
decades, reaching about $20 per tonne by the end of the next century. 
The  environmentally  correct  policy  of  a  20  percent  cut  would  impose 
significant  net  global  costs  of  $762  billion  in  annualized  terms.  The 
control rate in the environmentalist policy is higher than the optimal rate, 
                                                 
2 The DICE model assumes that a 3°C warming would lower world output by 1.3 percent 
and that the impact increases in a quadratic fashion with the temperature increase. Cline 
(1992) finds quantified impacts for the United States of 1.1 percent of GNP for a 2.S°C 
warming as opposed to the estimate of 1 percent for 3°C warming by the present author. 
Fankhauser (1992) estimates total impacts of a doubling of C02 would lead to a 1.3 
percent cost to the United States, a 1.4 percent cost to the OECD, and a 1.5 percent cost 
to the world.  
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  Manresa  and  Sancho  (2005)  follow  the  tradition  of  applied 
general equilibrium modelling of the Walrasian static variety to study the 
empirical viability of a double dividend (green, welfare, and employment) 
in  the  Spanish  economy.  They  consider  a  counterfactual  scenario  in 
which an eco-tax is levied on the intermediate and final use of energy 
goods.  Under  a  revenue  neutral  assumption,  they  evaluate  the  real 
income and employment impact of lowering payroll taxes. They perform 
simulations under a range of alternative model and policy scenarios to 
assess  the  extent  the  model  structure  and  behavioural  assumptions 
influence  the  results.  They  conclude  that  a  double  dividend  (better 
environmental  quality,  as  measured  by  reduced  CO2  emissions  and 
improved levels of employment) may be an achievable goal of economic 
policy. 
 
  Sterner (2007) provides a review several studies for a number of 
countries and concludes; “Had Europe not followed a policy of high fuel 
taxation  but  had  low  U.S.  taxes,  then  fuel  demand  would  have  been 
twice  as  large”.  Sterner  observes  that  fuel  taxes  are  the  single  most 
powerful climate policy instrument implemented to date. Environmental 
tax reform can have a powerful effect on energy use.  
 
  Ekins (2009) estimates the price elasticity of energy demand in 
the UK at about (-) 0.64, which implies that a 10 percent increase in the 
energy  price  will  reduce  energy  consumption  by  6.4  percent.  He  also 
finds  that  energy  use  tends  to  increase  with  value  added  with  an 
elasticity of (+) 0.5 (meaning that a 10 percent increase in value added 
will  tend  to  increase  energy  consumption  by  5  percent).  Other  things 
being equal, this means that if a sector (or by implication the economy as 
a  whole)  is  growing,  its  energy  use  will  be  growing  too,  unless  it  is 
restrained by a rising energy price.   
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  With  a  reasonable  change  in  the  relative  prices  of  labour  and 
environmental  resources,  environmental  tax  reform  may  significantly 
change  the  incentives  for  innovation  and  technological  development, 
inducing  companies  to  devote  more  effort  to  increasing  resource 
productivity,  and  less  to  increasing  labour  productivity.  Industries  that 
reduce pollution, increase resource productivity and encourage a switch 
to renewable resources. These industries are collectively being called the 
environment  industries  (EI)  which  have  two  distinct  components:  the 
supply of traditional pollution control technologies and services („end-of-
pipe  treatment‟)  and  industries  relating  to  resource  management 
(management of materials and energy). Both components of the EI have 
contributed to environmental improvement in the EU.  
 
How should Environmental Taxes and Environmental Subsidies 
be Combined? 
From Curbing Pollution to Promoting Environment  
One  related  question  is  how  revenues  from  the  environmental  taxes 
should be used. Should these become part of the general revenue pool of 
the  government  or  should  these  be  earmarked  for  environment 
promoting  activities.  By  definition,  if  the  environment  tax  is  a  cess  it 
should be earmarked for the sector or industry from where it has been 
raised.  Within  that  sector  it  needs  to  be  allocated  to  promoting 
environment promoting technologies and processes. There are however a 
number of taxes like taxes on petroleum products and electricity that, 
while raising revenues for the government, also serves to curb a polluting 
activity.  
 
3. INDIRECT TAX REFORM IN INDIA 
 
Towards  Taxing  the  Value-Added:  From  Central  Excise  to 
CENVAT 
The current generation of reforms of indirect taxes leading the system 
towards a value added tax started with the introduction of MODVAT from  
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March 1, 1986 with reference to specified Chapters of the Central Excise 
Tariff  Act,  1985.  At  first,  the  coverage  was  limited  to  37  out  of  91 
Chapters.  From  March  1,  1987,  all  commodities  except  petroleum 
products,  textiles,  tobacco,  cinematographic  films  and  matches  were 
covered. In the MODVAT system, early in the nineties, full rebate on the 
excise  tax  paid  on  capital  goods  was  allowed  instead  of  setting  up  a 
system of annual depreciation related deductions. With effect from 1995-
96, the entire manufacturing chain was brought under MODVAT.  
 
  The central government changed MODVAT to CENVAT in 1996-
97. The CENVAT covers value added in the case of production and sale of 
goods  up  to  the  stage  of  „manufacturing‟.  Compared  to  MODVAT, 
CENVAT had fewer rates. The taxation space up to the value added in 
the production of goods is common between the centre and states. While 
the tax structure was thus simplified, continuation of several surcharges 
and cesses continued to complicate the system. These are listed below: 
a.  Special Excise Duty, 
b.  National Calamity Contingent Duty, 
c.  Education Cess, 
d.  Secondary and Higher Education,  
e.  Cess on Motor Spirit, 
f.  Cess on High Speed Diesel Oil, 
g.  Surcharge on Motor Spirit, and 
h.  Surcharge on Pan Masala and Tobacco Products. 
 
Towards Taxing the Value Added: From Sales Tax to State VAT 
State  taxes  include  state  sales  taxes,  the  Central  Sales  Tax  (CST) 
assigned  by  the  central  government  to  the  states,  motor  vehicle  tax, 
state excise duties, entertainment taxes. The structure of sales tax, prior 
to  reforms  undertaken  in  late  nineties  was  characterized  by  high  tax 
rates,  multiplicity  of  tax  rate  and  exemptions,  lack  of  uniformity  in 
defining  the  tax  base  across  states,  large  number  incentives,  and 
cascading of taxes. During reforms of sales taxes prior to the introduction  
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of state VAT, most states had agreed to phase out the incentive related 
exemptions, and implement floor rates.  There are  several minor taxes 
imposed by the States on the sale, purchase, storage and movement of 
different goods.  
 
Apart from the general sales tax, most states levied an additional 
sales tax or a surcharge. In addition, the states levy luxury tax as also an 
entry  tax  on  the  sale  of  imported  goods.  All  these  practices  led  to 
heterogeneity in structure, as well as rates, causing diversion of trade as 
well  as  shifting  of  manufacturing  activity  from  one  state  to  another. 
Further, widespread taxation of inputs led to vertical integration of firms, 
encouraging production of more and more of the inputs needed rather 
than purchasing them from ancillary industries. This system taxation of 
goods  became  non-neutral,  interfering  with  the  producers'  choice  of 
inputs  as  well  as  with  the  consumers'  choice  of  consumption,  thereby 
leading to severe economic distortions.  
 
  With the initiative of Empowered Committee of the state Finance 
Ministers, states initiated indirect tax reforms in the late nineties. As a 
first step, they reduced the rate categories in the case of sales taxes, 
reduced  exemptions,  and  introduced  floor  rates.  There  were  tangible 
revenue  benefits  after  these  changes,  which  facilitated,  under  the 
guidance of the Empowered Committee, the implementation of state level 
VAT.  
 
The State-VAT recommended by the Empowered Committee of 
state Finance Ministers was elaborated in a White Paper brought out by 
the Government of India. The main features of the scheme suggested by 
the Empowered Committee were:   
a.  uniform  schedule  of  rates  of  VAT  for  all  states,  making  the 
system  simple  and  uniform  and  prevent  unhealthy  tax 
competition among states;   
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b.  the provision of input tax credit meant for preventing cascading 
effect of tax; 
c.  the  provision  self  assessment  by  dealers  aimed  at  reducing 
harassment; and 
d.  the zero rating if exports aimed at increasing the competitiveness 
of Indian exports. 
 
   As per the basic principles of VAT, the State-VAT provides that 
for all exports made out of the country, tax paid within the state will be 
refunded in full. Units located in Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and Export 
Oriented Units (EOUs) are to be granted either exemption from payment 
of input tax.  
 
   The most important part of the VAT scheme relates to the tax 
rates. Under the VAT system covering about 550 goods, only two basic 
VAT rates of 4 and 12.5 percent are to apply plus a specific category of 
tax-exempted goods and a special VAT rate of 1 percent only for gold 
and silver ornaments. 
 
Under the exempted category, the Empowered Committee placed 
46 commodities comprising of natural and unprocessed products in the 
un-organized  sector,  items  that  are  legally  barred  from  taxation  and 
items which have social implications. Under the state-VAT, there is the 
proposal to give flexibility to the states to select a set of maximum of 10 
commodities States for exemption from a list of goods specified by the 
Empowered  Committee,  which  are  of  local  social  importance  for  the 
individual States without having any inter-state implications. 
 
The rest of the commodities in the list are common for all the 
States. Under 4 percent VAT rate category, the largest number of goods 
(about 270) were placed, common for all the States, comprising of items 
of  basic  necessities  such  as  medicines  and  drugs,  all  agricultural  and 
industrial  inputs,  capital  goods  and  declared  goods.  The  remaining  
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commodities, common for all the States, will fall under the general VAT 
rate of 12.5 percent. 
 
It was proposed that VAT on AED items relating to sugar, textile 
and  tobacco,  because  of  initial  organizational  difficulties,  will  not  be 
imposed  for  one  year  after  the  introduction  of  VAT  and  till  then  the 
existing arrangement will continue.  
 
Expanding the Tax Base: Service Tax 
The service tax was levied for the first time in 1994-95 budget. Since 
then  its  rate  has  been  progressively  increased  and  the  number  of 
services under the service tax net has also been increased year after year 
(Table 1). 
Table 1: Taxation of Services 
Service Tax was introduced from 1st July 1994 
Union 
Budget 














1994-95   3    3  2004-05  7  65 
1996-97   3    6  2005-06  15  80 
1997-98   9  15  2006-07  12  92 
1998-99  11  26  2007-08  6  98 
2001-02  15  41  2008-09  4  102 
2002-03  10  51  2009-10  4  106 
2003-04   7  58  2010-11  8  114 
Source (Basic Data): Union Budgets, various years. 
 
Reducing the Tax Rate: Lowering Dependence on Indirect Taxes 
Reducing the tax rates as well as the number of rate categories was a 
key objective of the reform. In the case of CENVAT, most of the products 
used to attract excise duties at the rate of 14 percent until recently. As 
per an announcement in December 2008, the core Cenvat  rate has been 
brought down to 10 percent. Some products also attract special excise 
duty/and an additional duty of excise at the rate of 8 percent above the  
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Cenvat rate. In addition, there is a 2 percent education and 1 percent 
higher education cess applicable on the aggregate of the duties of excise. 
Excise duty is levied on ad valorem basis or based on the maximum retail 
price in some cases 
 
  In  2005,  the  core  Cenvat  rate  was  kept  at  16  percent  for  a 
majority of the items. There were two more rates: a demerit rate of 24 
percent  and  a  concessional  rate  of  8  percent.  Effectively,  there  were 
several other rates of excise duty that continue to be applied on different 
items,  subject  to  their  end-use.  With  the  2008-09  budget,  the  core 
Cenvat rate was brought down to 14 percent. This has now been brought 
down  to  10  percent.  The  adoption  of  the  statevat  also  led  to 
rationalization  and  some  reduction  in  the  tax  rates.  The  rate  of  the 
central sales tax was also gradually brought down.  
 


































  Reduction of indirect tax rates led to a fall in the share of indirect 
taxes in total taxes. This was compensated by a rise in the direct tax 
revenues so that the overall tax revenue relative to GDP except for a few 
initial  years  of  reforms  did  not  fall.  It  may  be  noted  that  the  rate 
reduction led to higher tax buoyancy in the case of direct taxes and fall in 
tax buoyancy in the case of indirect taxes (Appendix Table A2). However, 
it has reduced the dependence of overall tax revenues on indirect taxes 
thereby facilitating the move to the next stage of reforms towards GST 
where the risk of revenue shock to the system is less now than used to 
be the case. 
 
Unfinished Reforms 
While the system of taxation is thus characterized by fragmentation and 
overlaps in the case of goods, the taxation of services remains separated 
and  disjointed.  The  service  tax  is  levied  by  the  central  government. 
Taxation of goods by either tier of government may cascade into taxation 
of services and vice versa since goods are needed in the production and 
sale of services and services are needed in the production and sale of 
goods. The nature of a modern economy is such that it is often difficult 
to draw lines between goods and services as these are embedded into 
each  other.  Considering  the  value  added  of  goods  and  services  taken 
together in the overall Indian economy as providing a comprehensive tax 
base,  there  are  three  kinds  of  segmentations  that  take  place  in  India 
under the existing arrangements: segmentation of goods from services, 
segmentation  of  central  jurisdiction  vis-à-vis  state  jurisdictions,  and 
segmentation  of  production/manufacture  from  sale.  These  artificial 
divisions  for  purposes  of  taxation  lead  to  various  distortions, 
administrative and compliance costs, and inefficiencies. These are also 
not consistent with prevailing tax practices in the modern economies of 
the  world  who  have  implemented  a  value  added  tax  regime  including 
federal countries.  
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Thus, even after the introduction of the principle of taxation of 
value  added  in  India,  its  application  has  remained  piecemeal  and 
fragmented. Several problems continue with each segment of the system 
of taxation of goods and services as summarized below. 
1.  In  the  case  of  Cenvat,  the  issues  relating  to  definition  of 
manufacturing  and  methodology  of  valuation  remain  causing 
difficulties in implementation of the tax. 
2.  The  problem  of  multiple  rates  remains  although  the  tax  rate 
structure is simpler than what it used to be. This leads to various 
classification disputes.  
3.  In the case of services taxation, problems relate to distinguishing 
between a good and a service. The distinction between the two is 
often blurred. 
4.  Exclusion  of  services  from  the  tax  base  of  the  states  potentially 
erodes their tax- buoyancy in a growing economy. 
5.  Cascading has not been fully eliminated as there is cross cascading 
between Statevat, Cenvat, and central services tax. 
6.  The Central sales tax continues to cause artificial inter-state border 
boundaries and violating the destination based principle of taxation 
of goods and services.  
7.  Many of these problems can be addressed by extending the scope 
of taxation of services for the states and the scope of taxation of 
goods up to the retail stage for the centre.  
 
  This  is  not  to  underplay  the  importance  of  the  success  already 
achieved in bringing about a value added taxation mechanism in highly 
distorted system of taxation in India that existed prior to these reforms. 
However, the logic of reforms would remain incomplete until the goods 
and services are integrated for purposes of taxation of the value added in 
the  process  of  production  and  sale  of  goods  and  until  a  countrywide 




4. THE GST: THREE VERSIONS 
 
The  basic  idea  of  GST  is  to  adhere  closely  to  the  principle  of  a 
comprehensive  value  added  tax.  Three  versions  of  GST  are  currently 
under Discussion suggested respectively by the Empowered Committee 
of  State  Finance  Ministers,  Task  Force  of  the  Thirteenth  Finance 
Commission (which we may use as reference point as the 13 FC makes 
reference  to  it)  and  the  Model  GST  of  the  Thirteenth  Finance 
Commission.  In  all  three  cases,  the  GST  has  two  parts:  central  GST 
(CGST) and State GST (SGST). With a view to highlighting the similarities 
and differences between these proposals, we look at the following  six 
aspects  of  GST  proposed  by  these  models.  These  are:  (a)  broad 
structure, (b) central and state taxes to be merged in GST (c) treatment 
of inter-state sales, (d) rate structure, (e) threshold limits, and (f) place 
of environmental taxes.   
 
Broad Structure 
The broad structure of the GST is similar in all the three models. The GST 
consists of a central and state GST components (CGST and SGST) with 
the following main features:   
i.  The basic features of law such as chargeability, definition of 
taxable event and taxable person, measure of levy  including 
valuation  provisions,  basis  of  classification  etc.  should  be 
uniform across these statutes as far as practicable.  
 
ii.  The CGST and SGST would be applicable to all transactions of 
goods  and  services  made  for  a  consideration  except  for  the 
exempted  goods  and  services,  goods  which  are  outside  the 
purview  of  GST  and  the  transactions  which  are  below  the 
prescribed threshold limits.  
 
iii.  The  CGST  and  SGST  are  to  be  paid  to  the  accounts  of  the 
Centre and the States separately. Taxes paid against the CGST  
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and SGST will get input tax credit (ITC) within the CGST and 
SGST chains respectively but cross utilization of ITC between 
CGST and SGST would not be allowed.   
iv.  The administration of the CGST will be with the centre and that 
of SGST with the States.  
v.  The  GST  is  based  on  the  destination  principle.  This  requires 
that  inter-state  sales  of  goods  and  services  and  exports  are 
zero-rated.  
 
Taxes to be Merged 
There are however differences about the taxes to be merged. Table 2 
highlights these.  
 
The  most  comprehensive  list  has  been  proposed  by  the  Task 
Force. Between the 13
th FC and its Task Force, the inclusion of residential 
and commercial property is the additional inclusion in the latter. In the 
Empowered  Committee  list,  compared  to  that  of  the  13
th  FC,  the 
following are the main exclusions: stamp duty, tax on vehicles, purchase 
tax, and electricity duty. There is a difference in the way reference is 
made to the entry tax. In the EC case, it covers entry tax in lieu of octroi. 
In  the  case  of  the  13
th  FC,  it  refers  to  entry  tax  in  lieu  of  octroi  or 
otherwise. These differences have a bearing on the determination of the 




Table 2: Central and State Taxes to be Merged into GST 
 
Empowered Committee  Task Force (13
th FC)  13th Finance 
Commission 
Central Taxes     
(i) Central Excise Duty, (ii) 
Additional Excise Duties, (iii) 
Excise Duty levied under the 
Medicinal and Toiletries 
Preparation Act, (iv) Service 
Tax,  (v) Additional Customs 
Duty, commonly known as 
Countervailing Duty (CVD), 
(vi) Special Additional Duty 
of Customs (SAD), (vii) 
Surcharges, and (viii) 
Cesses.  
Central  Excise  Duty 
(including  Additional  Excise 
Duties);  
Service Tax;  
Additional  Customs  Duty 
(commonly  referred  to  as 
„CVD‟); and 
Surcharges and all cesses  
 
Central  excise  duty  and 
additional excise duties 
Service Tax 
Additional  Customs  Duty 
(Countervailing Duty ) 
All surcharges and cesses 
 
State Taxes     
(i)  VAT  /  sales  tax,  (ii) 
entertainment tax (unless it 
is levied by the local bodies, 
(iii) luxury tax, (iv) taxes on 
lottery,  betting  and 
gambling,  (v)  State  cesses 
and surcharges in so far as 
they  relate  to  supply  of 
goods and services, and (vi) 
entry  tax  not  in  lieu  of 
Octroi.  
 
VAT/Sales  Tax  (including 
central  sales  tax  and 
purchase tax);  
Entertainment  tax  (other 
than levied by local bodies);  
Entry  taxes  not  in  lieu  of 
Octroi;  
Other  Taxes  and  Duties 
(includes  luxury  tax,  taxes 
on  lottery,  betting  and 
gambling,  and  all  cesses 
and surcharges by States);  
Stamp duty;  
Taxes on Vehicles;  
Taxes  on  Goods  and 
Passengers; and  
Taxes  and  duties  on 
electricity.      
Residential and commercial 
property 
Value Added Tax 
Central Sales Tax 
Entry Tax, whether in lieu of 
octroi or otherwise 
Luxury Tax 




State Excise Duties 
Stamp Duty 
Taxes on vehicles 
Tax  on  goods  and 
passengers 
Taxes  and  duties  on 
electricity 








In the Empowered Committee model, the Centre would levy Integrated 
Goods and Services Tax (IGST) which would be CGST plus SGST on all 
inter-State transactions of taxable goods and services with appropriate 
provision for consignment or stock transfer of goods and services. The 
inter-State seller will pay IGST on value addition after adjusting available 
credit of IGST, CGST, and SGST on purchases. The exporting state will 
transfer to the Centre the credit of SGST used in payment of IGST. The 
importing dealer will claim credit of IGST while discharging his output tax 
liability in his own State. The Centre will transfer to the importing State 
the credit of IGST used in payment of SGST. The relevant information will 
also  be  submitted  to  the  Central  Agency  which  will  act  as  a  clearing 
house  mechanism,  verify  the  claims  and  inform  the  respective 
governments to transfer the funds.  Table 3 shows the mechanism of 
handling inter-state transactions by Empowered Committee, Task Force 
and the Thirteenth Finance Commission. 
 
Instead  of  IGST,  the  Task  Force  recommends  adoption  of  a 
Modified Bank Model (the Bank Model was referred to in the EC Draft 
Discussion Paper) and suggests that all inter-state transactions in goods 
and services should be effectively zero rated by adopting the Modified 
Bank Model.  The consignment sales and branch transfers across states 
should be subject to treatment in the same manner as if it was a inter-
state transaction in the nature of sale between two independent dealers.   
   
The Thirteenth Finance Commission has not specified any specific 
mechanism. Any model can be adopted which will satisfy the condition of 
zero rating of inter-state transactions and exports.  
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th FC)  13th Finance 
Commission 
Integrated GST (IGST) 
Centre to levy IGST 
which would be CGST 
plus SGST on all inter-
State transactions of 
taxable goods and 
services with appropriate 
provision for 
consignment or stock 
transfer of goods and 
services. 
Centre to transfer to the 
importing State the credit 
of IGST used in payment 
of SGST. 
Modified Bank model 
All inter-state 
transactions in goods 
and services to be zero 
rated using the Modified 
Bank Model.  The 
consignment sales and 
branch transfer should 
be similarly treated.  
Any model meeting the 
condition of zero-rating 




Keeping in view the compliance cost and administrative feasibility, small 
dealers  (including  service  providers)  and  manufacturers  should  be 
exempted  from  the  purview  of  both  CGST  and  SGST  if  their  annual 
aggregate turnover (excluding both CGST and SGST) of all goods and 
services  does  not  exceed  Rs.10  lakh.    However,  like  in  most  other 
countries,  those  below  the  threshold  limit  may  be  allowed  to  register 
voluntarily to facilitate sales to other registered manufacturers/dealers, 
limit competitive distortions and avoid inequities. Further, the threshold 
exemption limit should be uniform for both CGST and SGST and across 
States.  With a view to reducing administrative and compliance burden, 
small  dealers  with  annual  aggregate  turnover  of  goods  and  services 
between  Rs.10  lakh  to  Rs.40  lakh  may  be  allowed  to  opt  for  a 
compounded  levy  of  one  percent,  each  towards  CGST  and  SGST.  
However, no input credit should be allowed against the compounded levy 
or purchases made from exempt dealers (Table 4).     
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th FC)  13th Finance 
Commission 
 
SGST:  Gross  annual 
turnover  of  Rs.10  lakh 
both  for  goods  and 
services for all the States 
and Union Territories  
CGST:  
Separate  thresholds  for 
goods and services 
Goods: Rs.1.5 crore and 




(excluding both CGST 
and SGST) not to exceed 
Rs.10 lakh.   
Those below the 
threshold limit may 
register voluntarily 
Threshold exemption 
limit should be uniform 
for both CGST and SGST 
and across States.   
Small dealers with 
annual aggregate 
turnover of goods and 
services between Rs.10 
lakh to Rs.40 lakh may 
opt for a compounded 
levy of one percent.  
A  threshold  of  Rs.  10 
lakh  and  a  composition 
limit of Rs. 40 lakh  
Sales  of  goods  of  local 
importance will fall within 
these  threshold  limits, 
thus keeping them out of 
the ambit of GST. 
 
 
  The  Empowered  committee  considers  separate  thresholds  for 
goods and services and for SGST and CGST.  The  Task  Force and the 
Thirteenth  Finance  Commission  go  for  a  uniform  threshold.  The  EC 
considers  gross  annual  turnover  whereas  the  Task  Force  refers  to 
turnover net of CGST and SGST.  
 
Exemption Lists 
The Task Force suggests that the Centre and the States should draw up a 




i.  All  public  services  of  Government  (Central,  State  and 
municipal/panchayati  raj)  including  civil  administration,  health 
services  and  formal  education  services  provided  by  government 
schools and colleges, defence, para-military, police, intelligence and 
government  departments.  However,  public  services  should  not 
include railways, post and telegraph, other commercial departments, 
public sector enterprises, banks and insurance, health and education 
services;  
ii.  Any service transactions between an employer and employee either 
as a service provider, recipient or vice versa;   
iii.  any  unprocessed  food  article  which  is  covered  under  the  public 
distribution  system  should  be  exempt  regardless  of  the  outlet 
through which it is sold;  
iv.  education  services  provided  by  non-governmental  schools  and 
colleges; and  
v.  health services provided by non-governmental agencies.    
 
vi.  The Thirteenth Finance Commission follows a similar approach and 
observes  that  no  exemptions  should  be  allowed  other  than  a 
common  list  applicable  to  all  states  as  well  as  the  Centre,  which 
should only comprise: (i) unprocessed food items; (ii) public services 
provided by all governments excluding railways, communications 
and public sector enterprises and (iii) service transactions between 
an  employer  and  employee  (iv)  health  and  education  services.  It 
also says that the present area-based exemption schemes should be 
terminated.  The  existing  schemes  should  not  be  grandfathered. 
Alternative options like refunding taxes paid by industries in these 
locations could be considered. 
 
Determining the Overall Rate and Central and State Components 
An important issue is to determine a suitable GST rate. At present goods 
are taxed at the core rate of Cenvat at 10 percent and core State VAT of 
12.5 percent. This together would be very high although it would be less  
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than 22.5 percent as the 10 percent rate applies to value added only up 
to the manufacturing stage and the GST will have a larger base.  The 
service tax rate is 10 percent. The highest GST rates are in Sweden and 
Denmark at 25 percent. At the lower end, Switzerland, Japan, Thailand 
and Singapore have GST/VAT rates at 5 percent or marginally above.  
 
The Task Force and the 13
th FC suggest an overall rate of 12 
percent. The EC has not indicated the overall GST rate. The A related 
issue relates to decomposing the overall  GST rate into its central and 
state  components  making  sure  that  the  relative  pre-transfer  revenue 
levels are not disturbed. The Kelkar Committee had suggested a division 
of the overall rate of 20 percent into 12:8 ratio in favor the centre. This 
may need to be reexamined with current levels of revenues under Cenvat 
and service taxes and the Statevat and other related taxes that may be 
subsumed in the GST (Appendix Table A1).   GST rate structure as per 
the three models is shown in Table 5. 
 








2 Rate Structure 
Lower rate: 4-5 percent 
Core rate: 8-10 percent 
Services: one rate 
8-10 percent 
CGST: 5 percent 
SGST: 7 percent 
CGST: 5 percent 
SGST: 7 percent 
Stated as the target. 
 
   In  a  recent  study  Kavita  Rao  and  Pinaki  Chakraborty  (2008) 
estimate  the  revenue  neutral  GST  rate  using  two  methods,  namely,  a 
GDP  based  method  and  a  consumption  expenditure  based  method. 
Following the GDP–based method she estimates the revenue neutral GST 
rate to be about 14 with a 10 percent rate of non-rebatable excises on 
passenger  cars  and  multi-utility  vehicles,  petroleum  products,  and  
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tobacco  products.  Following  the  consumption  expenditure  method  she 
observes that the rate of GST required for revenue neutrality would be 
20  percent.  With  improved  tax  administration,  the  GST  rate  can  be 
reduced further.  
 
  The  Task  Force  of  the  Thirteenth  Finance  Commission  has 
estimated with reference to a comprehensive tax base (as discussed in 
this chapter) a revenue neutral rate of 12 percent, with 5 percent for the 
centre, and 7 percent for the states. 
 
Overtime  the  relative  share  of  the  GST  components  for  the 
centre  and  the  states  have  been  changing  marginally  away  from  the 
centre  due  to  the  erosion  of  buoyancy  of  Union  excise  duties  (see 
Appendix Table A2).  
 
The Task Force has recommended a single positive rate, each for 
CGST and SGST on all goods and services.  In addition, there should be a 
zero rate applicable to all goods and services exported out of the country.  
The  Task  Force  favours  a  single  rate  structure  GST  and  some 
international  experience  with  VAT  in  support.  States  have  said  that  a 
single  rate  of  State  GST  for  all  goods  and  services  will  be  highly 
regressive in India with its large low income population. It is mainly the 
articles of common consumption which are in the lower rate bands of 
VAT. The single revenue-neutral rate will definitely be much higher than 
the rate now prevailing at the lower bands.  To deal with problem, the 
Task  Force  suggests  a  moderate  threshold  exemption  level  for 
registration  of  dealers.    Consequently,  all  small  dealers  would  remain 
outside the purview of the GST. The Task Force Report argues that the 
tax incidence on products sold through such dealers would be relatively 
lower.    Since  the  poorer  section  of  the  society  tend  to  make  their 
purchases from such small and unregistered dealers, the consumption of 
any commodity by the poor would bear a relatively lower incidence of tax  
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than  the  consumption  of  the  same  commodity  by  the  relatively  richer 
section of the society.   
 
  The  Task  Force  has  used  the  fiscal  year  2007-08  as  the  base 
year for calculation of the revenue neutral rate (RNR).  For the purposes 
of estimation of the GST base, the Task Force used several alternative 
approaches  and  estimated  the  GST  base  under  these  methods.  The 
various estimates of the GST Base for 2007-08 are summarized in Table 
3.  Since  the  five  estimates  are  different,  the  Task  Force  adopts  their 
average  of  Rs.  3125325  crore,  as  the  size  of  the  comprehensive  GST 
base for 2007-08 for the purposes of estimating the RNR. Since the tax 
base for both the CGST and the SGST are proposed to be identical, the 
Task  Force  uses  the  same  tax  base  for  calculating  the  RNR  for  both 
levies.   
 
The Task Force estimated the RNR for the CGST at 5.0 percent. 
Similarly, the RNR in respect of the state level taxes which are proposed 
to  be  subsumed  in  the  SGST  is  estimated  to  be  7.0  percent.  The 
combined  RNR  is  estimated  to  be  12  percent.  The  Task  Force  also 
recommended  the  abolition  of  all  entry  and  Octroi  taxes  by  state 
governments and other sub-national governments. 
 
  Thus, there are clear differences in the GST rate and its structure 
between what the Empowered Committee is considering and what has 
been proposed by the Thirteenth Finance Commission and also it‟s Task 
Force.  These  differences  arise  because  of  the  coverage  of  goods  and 
their  exemption  considered  by  the  Empowered  Committee  compare  to 




th FC Task Force  considers the power sector is to be an integral 
part  of  the  comprehensive  GST.  The  tax  regime  for  the  power  sector 
should  be  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  any  other  normal  good.  The  
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electricity duty levied by the States should be subsumed in the SGST.  
Table 6 shows the provision for environmental taxes/ Demerit goods by 
the  Empowered  Committee,  Task  Force  and  the  Thirteenth  Finance 
Commission. 
 
The tax on vehicles and the tax on goods and passengers levied 
by  the  State  Governments  should  also  be  subsumed  in  the  GST.    All 
transport  equipments  and  all  forms  of  services  for  transportation  of 
goods and services by railways, air, road and sea must form an integral 
part of the comprehensive GST base recommended by the Task Force 
over  which  both  the  Central  and  State  Governments  would  have 
concurrent jurisdiction. The tax regime for the transport equipments and 
transport services should be the same as in the case of any other normal 
goods.  
   
  The Task Force refers to the demerit goods as sin goods. The sin 
goods are listed as emission fuels, tobacco products and alcohol, which 
should be subject to a dual levy of GST and excise. No input credit should 
be  allowed  for  this  excise  duty.  However,  industrial  fuels  should  be 
subjected only to GST (both Central and State) with the benefit of input 
credit like any other intermediate good.    
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Commission 
Taxation of Petroleum 
Products 
   
Crude,  motor  spirit 
(including  ATF)  and 
HSD  would  be  kept 
outside  GST  Sales  Tax 
could  continue  to  be 
levied by the States on 
these  products  with 
prevailing  floor  rate.  
Centre  could  also 
continue its levies.  
On  Natural  Gas  a  final 
view  has  not  been 
taken yet.   
Sales Tax/VAT to  
continue on alcoholic 
beverages  
In case it has been 
made Vatable by some 
States, this may 
continue. 
Tobacco products would 
be subjected to GST 
with ITC. Centre may 
be allowed to levy 
excise duty on tobacco 
products over and 
above GST without ITC. 
The sin goods are listed as 
emission fuels, tobacco 
products and alcohol, 
which should be subject to 
a dual levy of GST and 
excise. No input credit 
should be allowed for this 
excise duty. However, 
industrial fuels should be 
subjected only to GST 
(both Central and State) 
with the benefit of input 
credit like any other 
intermediate good. 
tax/fee/charge/cess which 
is essentially in the nature 
of a user charge for supply 
of goods and services 
(including 
environmental goods 
and services) also should 
not be subsumed under 
the CGST or SGST. 
Further, both Centre and 
the States should take 
steps to consolidate all 
taxes (other than proposed 
GST) on the sin goods as a 
single levy termed as 
Central Excises and 
State Excises, 
respectively. 
HSD, MS, and ATF could 
be charged GST and an 
additional  levy  by 
both  the  Central  and 
State  Governments.  No 
input  credit  would  be 
available  against  either 
CGST  or  SGST  on  the 
additional levy.  
A  similar  treatment 
would  be  provided  to 
alcohol and tobacco.  
Such an arrangement to 






Any  amount  collected  through  these  taxes  on  the  SIN  goods 
should not be subsumed either in the CGST or the SGST.  Similarly any 
amount which is collected as tax/fee/charge/cess which is essentially in 
the nature of a user charge for supply of goods and services (including 
environmental goods and services) also should not be subsumed under 
the CGST or SGST. Further, both Centre and the States should take steps 
to consolidate all taxes (other than proposed GST) on the sin goods as a 
single levy termed as Central Excises and State Excises, respectively.   All 
entry and Octroi duties levied by the third-tier of Government must be 
abolished.  
 
  Thus,  the  Task  Force  on  GST  set  up  by  the  13
th  Finance 
Commission  recognized  the  issue  of  negative  externalities  in  a  clearer 
way and collectively refers to these as sin goods and services and makes 
a  distinction  between  sin  goods  and  non-sin  goods.  The  Task  Force 
defines  sin  goods  as  goods  whose  consumption  create  negative 
externalities  and  for  the  purposes  of  their  Report  it,  collectively  or 
severally, refers to emission fuels, tobacco goods and alcohol. It observes 
that emission fuels generate negative externalities, whose consumption 
needs  to  be  checked.  It  notes  that  generally,  goods  with  negative 
externalities  should  be  subjected  to  excise  duties  in  respect  of  which 
input tax credit is not allowed.  
 
The  Thirteenth  Finance  Commission  has  suggested  that  the 
taxation of petroleum products and natural gas would be rationalised by 
including them in the tax base. HSD, MS, and ATF could be charged GST 
and an additional levy by both the Central and State Governments. No 
input  credit  would  be  available  against  either  CGST  or  SGST  on  the 
additional  levy.  A  similar  treatment  would  be  provided  to  alcohol  and 
tobacco.  Such  an  arrangement  would  ensure  protection  of  existing 




5. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES 
 
Environmental tax reform in different countries across the world mainly 
aim at shifting the tax burden from factors of production, such as labour 
and  capital,  to  pollution  and  the  use  of  natural  resources  (EC,  1997). 
Elements of Strategic tax reform generally involve three complementary 
activities (EEA,  1996; OECD,  1997): (a) removal of  existing taxes and 
subsidies that have negative environmental impacts; (b) restructuring of 
existing taxes in an environmentally friendly manner; and (c) introducing 
new environmental taxes. 
 
  The international with green taxes indicates that while the initial 
emphasis  was  on  energy  and  transport,  the  tax  bases  for  the 
environmental taxes have expanded over time. Apart from the fuel taxes 
that are levied in all countries in Europe, other taxes include waste end 
taxes  (in  Austria,  Finland,  France,  Greece,  Italy,  Sweden,  Norway  and 
UK),  packaging  (in  Italy),  solvents  (Denmark  and  Norway),  PVC/ 
phthalates (Denmark), and annual car taxes differentiated according to 
environmental characteristics (Germany) (EEA, 2000). Table 7 provides a 
summary of the environmental effectiveness of the green shift in taxation 
across  various  countries.  International  experience  has  shown  that 
environmental taxes can be quite effective in their environmental impact.  
   
Many  countries  have  undertaken  formal  or  informal  reduction 
targets for greenhouse gases emissions. With the Climate Change Act, 
the UK Government has now legislated into statute the commitment to 
reduce the greenhouse gases emissions (GHGs) by 80 percent from 1990 
levels by 2050. This will require comparable reductions in emissions of 
carbon dioxide, the principal greenhouse gas, which are mainly the result 
of burning fossil fuels. The Climate Change Committee has recommended 
that to meet this, the UK should reduce its GHG emissions by a minimum 
of 34 percent from 1990 levels by 2020. Most of the reductions by 2020 
will have to come from the large-scale deployment of new renewables 
technologies.   
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Table 7: Impact of the Green Shift in Taxation: Selected 
International Evidence 
 





Impact  Source 
Finland - 
energy and 
carbon tax                 
1990-2005  CO2  emissions  7  percent  lower  than  would  have 
otherwise been  
A shift from carbon tax to output tax on electricity in 









1991-2007  21 percent reduction in CO2 from power plants by 
1995   
14  percent  national reduction in CO 2  in 1990's, 2 
percent attributed to carbon tax  











1992  CO2 emissions in affected sectors down by 6 percent 
and economic growth up by 20  percent  between 
1988  and  1997  and  a  5  percent  reduction  in 
emission in one year in response to tax increase  
In 1990s a 23  percent  reduction in CO 2  from as 
usual trend and energy efficiency increased by 26 
percent  
Subsidy  to  renewables  may  have  accounted  for 








energy  & 
carbon taxes 
1990-2007  Emissions reductions of 0.5 million tons per annum 
Emissions would have been 20  percent higher than 










1999-2007  Emissions  3.5  percent  lower  than  would  have  
otherwise been  
Low tax rates may have limited impact 
Finance 





tax  reform, 




1999-2005  CO2 reduced by 15 percent between 1990 and 1999 
and 1 percent between 1999 and 2005  
CO2 emissions 2-3 percent lower by 2005 than they 
would have been without tax 







2001-2010  UK CO2 emissions reduced by 2 percent in 2002 and 
2.25 percent in 2003 and cumulative savings of 16.5 
million tonnes of carbon up to 2005 
 Reduction  in  UK  energy  demand  of  2.9  percent 





HMT 2006  
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Increasing  the  price  of  energy  is  considered  to  be  critical 
intervention  for  achieving  the  GHG  emissions  reduction  targets 
internationally. Increased energy efficiency through higher investment in 
renewables and reduced demand for energy services will also help India 
achieve the emission reduction target for which a commitment has been 
made.  
 
In  the  past  there  have  been  two  sources  of  energy  price 
increases: from markets, as (for example) the oil price increases in 1973 
and 1979, and more recently in 2007-08; and from government policy, 
mainly from taxation such as fuel duty or the Climate Change Levy in the 
UK.  Both  these  taxes  have  reduced  fuel  use  below  what  they  would 
otherwise have been, although in the case of fuel duty even a relatively 
high  rate  of  duty  has  not  been  enough  to  actually  reduce  the  use  of 
transport  fuels.  In  Germany  however,  a  90  percent  increase  in  diesel 
prices and 62 percent increase in petrol prices over 1997-2006, largely 
driven by increases in taxation, caused the total consumption of the main 
road fuels to decrease by 13 percent. 
 
  But price increases by government keep revenues in the country 
and generate tax receipts which allow other taxes to be reduced. There is 
a  very  important  economic  difference  between  market-driven  and 
taxation-driven increases in energy prices. In the case of the former the 
extra  revenues  accrue  to  energy  companies  and  energy-producing 
countries, at the expense of energy-consuming countries. With the latter 
the  government  of  the  energy-consuming  country  keeps  the  revenues 
from  the  price  increase,  which,  for  a  given  level  of  government 
expenditure,  allows  it  to  reduce  other  taxes,  with  greatly  reduced 
negative impacts on its economy. 
 
  Another important difference is that market-driven increases in, 
for  example,  oil  prices  will  stimulate  investment  into  high-carbon 
substitutes for crude  oil (e.g. oil shale and tar  sands  - as indeed has  
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happened with the relatively high oil prices over 2006-08) as well as into 
low-carbon energy sources. Government taxation, in contrast, can target 
carbon  emissions  through  a  carbon  tax,  which  would  penalize  high-
carbon  oil  substitutes  and  be  far  more  effective  in  promoting  new 
investment into low-carbon energy sources. 
 
  There  are  important  lessons  for  India  from  the  international 
experience.  First,  the  tax  on  energy  should  be  allowed  to  continue  to 
cascade and polluting goods and services should be differentially taxed at 
higher  rate.  Further,  India  should  develop  capacity  in  environment 
industries where there is the potential of considerable growth of demand 
rather than concentrating on polluting industries where already there is 
considerable excess capacity globally. 
 
6. INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES INTO GST DESIGN 
 
Three Forms of Environmental Taxes in GST Framework 
Looking at the three versions of the GST, it appears that three routes for 
the environmental taxes can be part of the overall  scheme of indirect 
taxes  in  India  the  core  of  which  can  be  the  GST.  These  are:  non-
rebatable excise duties by the centre and the states on selected polluting 
products, environmental cesses where a link can be established between 
the revenue from the cess and the environmental promoting activity, and 
user charges. In addition, at the local government level environmental 
taxes like the congestion charges can be levied. The most important of 
these will be the non-rebatable excises and the selection of goods that 
can  be  placed  under  these.  The  13
th  Finance  Commission  has  made 
reference  to  all  of  these  but  the  coverage  of  goods  for  non-rebatable 
excises  is  limited  to  petroleum  products,  alcoholic  beverages,  and 
tobacco. The mention regarding cesses is about cesses for emergency 
conditions. In other places, the Commission says that all cesses should  
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be  merged.  The  Task  Force  asks  for  subjecting  all  environmental 
polluting goods to a non-rebatable excise.  
 
Taxation of Petroleum Products 
Taxation of petroleum products will be a key component of the taxes that 
can serve an environmental objective. The 2009-10 Union Budget has not 
only restored the earlier customs duty rate and excise duty rate but also 
given the signal that the government will move towards de-administering 
the pricing regime and making all subsidies transparent.  In this regards, 
the three GST models discussed above have different propositions. The 
Empowered  Committee  model  keeps  taxation  of  petroleum  out  of  the 
GST framework while the other two make a distinction between emission 
fuels and others. The first step in rationalizing the scheme is to establish 
a clear distinction between international/ producer‟s price of petroleum 
products, subsidy elements if any, and the overall tax component with 
and  without  cascading.  The  second  step  is  to  take  into  account  any 
increase  in  the  tax  component  and  consequent  increase  in  the  tax 
revenues  to  reduce  fully  or  partially  the  core  GST  rate.  International 
evidence  indicates  that  Indian  retail  prices  of  petroleum  products  are 
some where around the average and not the highest.  The same applies 
to other demerit goods like alcohol and tobacco. 
 
Coverage of Other Polluting Goods 
A select number of other polluting goods should be subjected to either a 
non-rebatable excise over and above the GST or a cess. When a cess is 
levied,  the  revenue  should  be  earmarked  for  the  same  industry  for 
environmental  promoting  activities.  It  may  be  noted  that  in  the  GST, 
effective  tax  rate  of  some  of  the  polluting  goods  are  bound  to  come 
down  compared  to  present  tax  rates,  central  and  state  rates  taken 
together.  This  is  bound  to  encourage  pollution.  This  needs  to  be 
corrected in moving to GST by a non-rebatable excise or cess. 
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  Table  8  indicates  that  many  of  the  polluting  good  suffered  a 
higher  indirect  tax  rate  in  2006-07.  By  that  time  many  states  had 
accepted and implemented Statevat. Only a few states implemented it 
after 2006-07. Clearly, a lowering of the GST rate from these high levels 
would  encourage  greater  used  of  the  polluting  goods.  The  Thirteenth 
Finance Commission based on the NCAER report has observed that the 
move  to  GST  will  have  positive  environmental  outcomes.  This  is  base 
mainly on estimated lower energy consumption while growth takes place. 
Since the NCAER report uses 2003-04 input-output coefficient matrixes 
and since these coefficients remain fixed any substitution effects induce 
by lowering of effective tax rate on the polluting goods are not captured. 
On the aspect of energy intensity of growth both international and India 
experience  indicates  that  with  technological  improvement  energy 
intensity has been going down. GST has no direct bearing on it.  
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Table 8: Effective Tax Rates for Selected Polluting 
Goods/Industries 
 
Indirect Taxes Net of Subsidies as percentage of Gross Value Added 
   2003-04  2006-07     2003-04  2006-07 
Electrical industrial 
machinery  
112.8  81.8  Fertilizers   24.7  28.1 
Batteries   81.8  61.9  Motor cycles and 
scooters  
30.0  27.5 
Electrical wires & cables   73.6  59.5  Soaps, cosmetics & 
glycerin  
22.7  26.4 
Petroleum products  31.9  56.9  Drugs and medicines   23.3  25.0 
Iron and steel foundries  52.0  56.7  Non-ferrous basic 
metals  
32.0  24.1 
Electrical appliances   70.0  56.2  Other chemicals   23.3  23.7 
Plastic products  42.9  39.8  Pesticides   20.1  23.4 
Iron and steel casting & 
forging 
35.5  35.0  Coal tar products   24.3  21.6 
Paints, varnishes and 
lacquers  
30.3  34.4  Printing and 
publishing  
21.3  19.4 
Motor vehicles   37.0  34.1  Iron, steel and ferro 
alloys 
9.1  17.1 
Synthetic fibers, resin   28.1  32.7  Leather and leather 
products  
8.2  17.0 
Inorganic heavy chemicals   29.9  31.5  Cotton textiles   10.1  10.1 
Paper, paper prods. & 
newsprint  
35.3  31.4  Cement   12.5  9.9 
Organic heavy chemicals   28.8  30.8  Electricity   -31.5  -20.3 
Notes: 1. 2003-04 rates are based on commodity by commodity matrix 
  2. 2006-07 rates are based on commodity by industry matrix 
  3. Negative value means that the good/industry is net subsidized. 
Source: Based on Input-Output Tables of India, CSO. 
 
 
Taxation of Coal 
A  key  component  of  the  environmental  taxes  will  have  to  relate  to 
taxation of coal. In the Union Budget of 2010-11, for the first time the 
central government has taken the initiative of levying a cess of Rs. 50 per  
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tonne on domestically produced and imported coal. The revenue of this 
cess will form the resource pool for a „clean coal fund‟. 
 
Other State and Local Taxes 
In addition to the GST there would be other state and local taxes which 
may be used to serve as environmental purpose. Congestion taxes and 
preferential treatment to green properties in the case of property tax are 
two examples. 
 
Pricing of Polluting Goods 
The effect of environmental taxes are often negated and almost always 
difficult to work out when important polluting goods like petroleum, coal, 
and fertilizers are characterized by administered pricing regimes and non-
transparent subsidies. Market-determined prices and transparent subsidy 




Apart  from  subsidies  that  may  be  linked  to  cesses,  environment 
promoting subsidies should also be drawn from the general budget. The 
Union Budget of 2010-11 has taken several initiatives in their directions 
including support for installing a zero liquid discharge system as Thirupur 
in  Tamil  Nadu  and  support  for  National  Ganga  River  Basin  Authority. 
Similarly,  the  Thirteenth  Finance  Commission  has  recommended  three 
specific  grants  for  promoting  environment  in  addition  to  various  state 
specific grants. These grants are aimed at increasing the forest cover in 
India promoting connectivity of renewable energy to National grid and 
better management of water resources. At the same time, many of the 






  The main reason for resisting environmental fiscal reforms is the 
perception that it would slow down growth. Growth is energy-intensive 
and  environmental  taxes  make  energy  costlier.  However,  many 
international studies (see, Ekins, 2009 for a perspective) have shown the 
effect  of  environmental  tax  reform  with  the  green  shift  may  have 
negligible adverse effect on growth and positive effect on employment.  
The  Central  Ministry  of  Power  (2007)  notes  that  in  the  high  growth 
period  of  2004-08,  an  economic  growth  rate  of  over  9  percent  per 
annum, which has been achieved with an energy growth of less than 4 
percent per annum. With subsidy interventions, a steady reduction in the 
energy-intensity of growth can be achieved over and above the trend in 
order to meet India‟s self-commitment of reducing the carbon-intensity 
by 20-25 percent by 2020.    
 
7. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
In this paper we have highlighted that inspite of efforts for  reforming 
indirect taxes in India over a period of two decades, the system remains 
highly  segmented  where  cascading  continues  between  Statevat  and 
Cenvat, and between taxation of goods and services. Inter-state barriers 
of trade also continue because of the central sale tax. Although taxation 
of  petroleum  products  at  high  rates  serves  an  environmental  purpose 
also  pricing  and  taxation  in  this  sector  suffers  from  considerable  non-
transparency. Coal and coal products have also been taxed at relatively 
lower  rates.  A  systematic  policy  for  many  indirect  taxes  for  curbing 
pollution and promoting environment has not been put in place.   The 
forthcoming introduction of GST provides the relevant context were the 
overall design of GST should incorporate the environmental taxes with a 
view  to  imparting  a  green  shift  to  India‟s  tax  system  in  line  with 
comparable  international  experience.  Although  there  are  considerable 
differences  among  the  three  models  of  GST  that  are  currently  under 
discussion viz., the model proposed by the Empowered Committee of the  
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State  Finance  Ministers,  The  Task  Force  of  Thirteenth  Finance 
Commission and the model GST recommended by the Thirteenth Finance 
Commission,  in  all  cases  there  is  a  clear  recognition  of  the  need  for 
environmental taxes, an reference has been made to demerit goods/sin 
goods/environment (polluting) goods.  
 
The Thirteenth Finance Commission has made reference to three 
forms of environmental taxes” Non-rebatable excise duties, cesses, and 
user charges. These three forms of environmental taxes can be used to 
serve different purposes. Non-rebatable excises add to overall GST level, 
and this should be used to at least partially reduce the core GST rate.  
Cesses  should  be  earmarked  for  environment  promoting  activities  in 
industries  to  cover  cost  of  specific  publically  provided  environmental 
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 Appendix Table A1: Revenue Importance of Central and States 
Taxes for Determining GST Rate Shares 
                                          (Rs. crore) 
Central and State Taxes     2000-01  2001-02 2002-03  2003-04 
Central  Taxes  (Union  Excise  Duties  + 
Service Tax + CVD + SAD)   
90990  93692  105963  119116 
State Taxes: Group 1#     104824  112054  124556  142613 
State Taxes: Group 1+ Group 2##     116010  125039  139981  160474 
Centre + State I     195814  205746  230519  261729 
Share of Centre (%)    46.5  45.5  46  45.5 
Share of States (%)    53.5  54.5  54  54.5 
Centre + States II     207000  218731  245944  279590 
Share of Centre (%)    44  42.8  43.1  42.6 
Share of States (%)     56  57.2  56.9  57.4 
Central and State Taxes  2004-05  2005-06  2006-07   2007-08  2008-09 
Central  Taxes  (Union  Excise  Duties  + 
Service Tax + CVD + SAD) 
135470  164031  203841  234826  233469 
State Taxes: Group 1#  164478  182077  213714  247495  284153 
State Taxes: Group 1+ Group 2##  186785  209744  249687  290186  333448 
Centre + State I  299948  346108  417555  482321  517622 
Share of Centre (%)  45.2  47.4  48.8  48.7  45.1 
Share of States (%)  54.8  52.6  51.2  51.3  54.9 
Centre + States II  322255  373775  453528  525012  566917 
Share of Centre (%)  42  43.9  44.9  44.7  41.2 
Share of States (%)  58  56.1  55.1  55.3  58.8 
Source: Reserve Bank of India: State Finances and Union Budget Documents (Receipts 
Budget). 
Central  taxes  include  Union  excise  duties,  service  tax,  additional  duties  of  customs  and 
special CVD. 
#  Group  1:  All  sales  taxes,  state  excise  duties,  motor  vehicle  tax,  tax  on  goods  and 
passengers, taxes and duties on electricity, entertainment tax, other taxes on goods and 
services 
## Group 2: land revenue, stamps and registration fees, urban immovable property tax 
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Appendix Table A2: Buoyancy of Direct and Indirect Tax 
Revenues with respect to GDP at Market Prices 
 
   b(TTR)  b(ITR)  b(CITR) 
1990-91  0.584  0.799  0.702 
1991-92  2.400  0.983  0.785 
1992-93  1.097  0.637  0.577 
1993-94  0.798  0.384  -0.124 
1994-95  1.905  1.078  1.029 
1995-96  1.378  0.995  1.090 
1996-97  0.942  0.938  1.085 
1997-98  2.142  0.587  0.008 
1998-99  -0.191  0.552  0.469 
1999-00  2.085  1.414  1.489 
2000-01  2.326  1.206  0.743 
2001-02  0.223  0.401  -0.241 
2002-03  2.531  1.477  1.616 
2003-04  2.077  1.084  1.032 
2004-05  1.755  1.208  1.099 
2005-06  1.604  1.265  1.294 
2006-07  2.514  1.342  1.449 
2007-08  2.185  1.125  1.125 
2008-09  1.539  1.189  1.191 
Average       
1990-95  1.357  0.776  0.594 
1995-2000  1.271  0.897  0.828 
2000-04  1.782  1.075  0.850 
2005-09  1.961  1.231  1.265 
Source  (Basic  Data):  Indian  Public  Finance  Statistics  and  National  Income  Accounts, 
Various Issues 
Note:  TTR:  Total direct taxes, ITR: total indirect taxes: CITR: central indirect taxes 
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